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An arbitrator’s problem is how to divide a pie fairly among a society of agents.
In the standard bargaining scenario, which is often motivated via the arbitration
metaphor, fairness of the outcome is deﬁned with respect to a prespeciﬁed dis-
agreement outcome.1 B u ti ti sn o tc l e a rw h yt h ea g e n t ss h o u l di m p l e m e n tt h e
disagreement point in the case they cannot agree on the division. Namely the
agents can always - since they form the society - take the decision into their own
hands. Disagreement should therefore reﬂect the potentially arduous process of
bargaining among the individuals.
This paper studies allocations that can be implemented by the arbitrator sub-
ject to the constraint that the agents’ outside option is to start bargaining by
themselves. More precisely, the arbitrator serves as the ﬁr s tp r o p o s e ri nt h eg a m e
where the agent who rejects the arbitrator’s proposal becomes the ﬁrst proposer
in the unanimity bargaining game (a multiplayer extension of Rubinstein, 1982).
The arbitrator’s objective is to implement a Pareto optimal outcome.
Our main focus is in large societies. Assuming stationary equilibrium in the
bargaining game, we show that the set of feasible allocations shrinks to a singleton
set as the number of agents becomes large. This is due to the fact that as the
number of agents’ grows, the bargaining power of a single agent (measured in as
the ﬁrst mover advantage) becomes small. The limit allocation can be interpreted
as the conﬂict-free outcome: no individual wants to challenge it by starting to
bargain. We give a simple ﬁnite characterization of the conﬂict-free allocation
(under the hypothesis that the agents’ time-preferences are drawn from a ﬁnite set
of preferences).
Admittedly, implementing a rule in a large society that is contingent on the
individuals’ time-preferences is too unrealistic. The second task of the paper is
to oﬀer a practical solution the implementation problem. We identify a simple
mechanism that induces the conﬂict-free solution in a unique equilibrium. The
content of the mechanism is the following. First all agents with similar preferences
are grouped together to form a "party". The party, or its representative, acts
on behalf of all its members - gains and losses of the party are divided evenly
among the members of the group. The task of parties is to engage into bargaining
over common resources - they do "politics". However, before doing that they
c o m p e t eo v e rt h er i g h tt om a k et h eﬁrst proposal in the bargaining game - they
give promises of how much of their own good they will give up for the common
good. The winning bid is added to the pool of common resources that is later
shared via bargaining.
It is shown that the unique equilibrium outcome (under the stationarity as-
1For the arbitration interpretation of bargaining solutions, see e.g. Luce and Raiﬀa (1957).
1sumption) coincides with the conﬂict-free allocation. Hence we obtain a version
of the Core convergence result: the outcome that is obtained in large bargaining
markets with negligent bargaining power can be simulated in a small market with
a "Walrasian" auctioneer.
This paper is related to Kultti and Vartiainen (2007a) who study convergence
of bargaining outcomes in a related model of large population. The driving force
behind the convergence in there as well as in here is that as the number of players
increases the bargaining power of individual players vanishes. An important ob-
servation is that convergence has diﬀerent characteristic than when the bargaining
power vanishes due to speeding up the bargaining process (Binmore et al., 1986).
In particular, the convergence point under large population is not related to the
Nash bargaining solution.2
First we deﬁne the set up and specify the bargaining game. Then we establish
the feasible arbitrations schemes. Finally, the implementation result is proven. All
omitted proofs are in the appendix.
2T h e s e t u p
There is a society of agents, distributing common resources. The primitive of the
model is the set of agents, their time-preferences and resources. There are 1,...,n
agents, each of them endowed with one unit of resources. As an agent enters the
society, his resources become part of the common pool of resources.
Time preferences of the agent i has the representation ui(xi)δ
t, where xi ∈ R+ is
the agent’s consumption. We assume that the publicly observable utility functions
u1,...,un are drawn independently from a ﬁnite set U, whose cardinality is also
denoted by U. The probability of u ∈ U is λu, a rational number. We assume that
each u ∈ U is concave and continuously diﬀerentiable function and that δ ∈ (0,1).3
Given ui, deﬁne a function vi that speciﬁes the present consumption value of
xi in date 1 such that
ui(vi(xi)) = ui(xi)δ, for all xi ∈ [0,1]. (1)
By the concavity of ui, u0
i(xi)/ui(xi) is a monotonically decreasing, strictly positive
2However, see Thomson and Lensberg (1989).
3Weaker conditions would suﬃce (see Fishburn and Rubinstein, 1981, or Kultti and Vartiainen
2007a,b). The current choice is for simplicity.
























> 1, for all xi ≥ 0. (3)
This property will be used when we prove the existence of a stationary equilibrium.
3 The unanimity bargaining game
For later purposes, we discuss of the bargaining game in a more general level than
the current set up requires. Let the size of shareable resources be X>0, and the








i∈N xi ≤ X
ª
.
Given N and X, we deﬁne a unanimity bargaining game ΓN(X,i) as follows: At
any stage t =0 ,1,2,...,
• Player i(t) ∈ N makes an oﬀer x ∈ S. Players j 6= i(t) accept or reject the
oﬀer in the ascending order of their index.4
• If all j 6= i(t) accept, then x is implemented. If j is the ﬁrst who rejects,
then j becomes i(t +1 ) .
• i(0) = i.
We focus on the stationary subgame perfect equilibria, simply equilibria or
SPE in the sequel, of the game, where:
1. Each i ∈ N makes the same proposal x(i) whenever he proposes.
2. Each i’s acceptance decision in period t depends only on xi that is oﬀered to
him in that period.
4The order in which players response to a proposal does not aﬀect the results.
3We now characterize equilibria.5 We ﬁrst state an important intermediate
result.
Lemma 1 For any Y> 0 and c ∈ RN
++, there is a unique x =( xi)i∈N and d>0
such that
cixi = vi(ci(xi + d)), for all i ∈ N, (4)
P
i∈N
xi = Y. (5)
Lemma 2 xi is a stationary equilibrium outcome of ΓN(X,i) if and only if xi =
(xi + d,x−i), for x and d>0 such that
xi = vi(xi + d), for all i ∈ N, (6)
P
i∈N
xi = X − d. (7)
Choosing Y = X − d and combining Lemmata 1 and 2 the following result is
obtained.
Proposition 1 A stationary equilibrium of ΓN(X,i) exists. Moreover, it is unique.
Thus in our n−player set, the pool of shareable resources is n and the game is
Γ{1,...,n}(n).
Corollary 1 A stationary equilibrium of Γ{1,...,n}(n,i) exists. Moreover, it is
unique.
4 Arbitrator’s problem
Given the set of agents 1,...,n and the amount of shareable resources n, let there
be an arbitrator who suggests an allocation to the society subject to the constraint
that every agent must accept the proposal. A rejection triggers a bargaining game.
That is, an agent i who rejects the oﬀer becomes the ﬁrst proposer in the unanymity
game Γ{1,...,n}(n,i), starting.with one period delay. Given that the arbitrator wants
to induce a Pareto optimal outcome, the indeucable outcomes must be such that
all agents accept the proposal.
Proposition 2 Let x satisfy (6) and (7) for some d. Then allocation y is a feasible
arbitration scheme if and only if
P
i xi ≤ n and xi ≥ yi, for all i =1 ,...,n.
By (7), the set of feasible allocations y is nonempty.
5Our treatment draws on Krishna and Serrano (1996).
44.1 Large Population: Conﬂict-free allocation
We now establish that when the number of agents increases, the set of feasible
outcomes shrinks and reaches, in the limit, a singleton set. To characterize the











u =1 . (9)





ˆ u + d∗).
Then construct the conﬂict-free allocation x∗ =( x∗
1,x ∗





u if u = ui,for all i =1 ,2,..., for all u ∈ U. (10)
Since each λu is rational, it is not diﬀcult to see from Lemma 1 that the desired
y∗ and d∗ do exist.
Proposition 3 As n →∞ , an allocation y is a feasible arbitration scheme if and
only if it coincides with the conﬂict-free allocation x∗.
4.2 Implementation procedure: Competitive lobbying
We now construct a simple mechanism that implements the conﬂict-free allocation
x∗ when n is large. Let the agents form homogenous groups - "parties" - based
on their preferences. That is for each u ∈ U all the agents of type u constitute
a group. By the law of large numbers, the share of the agents in the u−group is
λu of the set of all agents as n becomes large. Let each group select one agent
as the representative of the group who is entitled to bargain and trade on behalf
of the whole group. Gains and losses of the group are divided equally among its
members.
Consider then a market where the right to be the ﬁrst proposer in a bar-
gaining game is sold after a bidding contest to one of the U groups (or their
representatives). The right is sold to the group that makes the highest bid (break
ties by using randomization). Once the price p is paid by the winner it is added
to the pool of resources over which bargaining then takes places.
The bidding contest can be interpreted as a "lobbying" game where all the
groups, "political parties", bid for the right to be the leader in the bargaining
game, "political process", that follows the bidding contest. Only one group can
serve as the initial proposer and hence enjoy from the bargaining power that comes
with it.
5More formally, since the agents’ utility functions are i.i.d, λu is the limit share
of type u agents in the population as the population becomes large. Since all
gains and losses of the group are divided equally among its members, if zu is
the u−group’s relative share of the total shareable resources, an u−type agent’s
consumption is approximated by λ
−1
u zu as n becomes large. It is convenient to
describe the u−group’s agents utilities directly in terms of zu. The utility function







, for all zu ∈ [0,1]. (11)
Function ¯ u is convex and continuous since u is. Deﬁne the function ¯ v such that
¯ u(¯ v(zu)) = ¯ u(zu)δ, for all zu ∈ [0,1].
Note that (3) applies to ¯ v as well.
Denote the set of normalized utility functions by ¯ U. The rules of the bidding
mechanism Γ∗ are formally as follows: Players in the set ¯ U ﬁrst cast their bids.
Given the normalized resources 1, if i ∈ ¯ U wins the bidding contest with bid p,
then the bargaining game Γ
¯ U(1 + p : i), with i as the ﬁrst proposer, is initiated.
Our claim is that this mechanismimplements the conﬂict-free arbitration scheme.
First, let zj(X) be what a receiver j gets in the game Γ
¯ U(X : i). By (6) and (7)








for all i. (12)
By the Implicit Function Theorem, zi(·) is continuous.
Lemma 3 zi(X) is strictly increasing in X,f o ra l li.
Proof. Rewrite condition (12) as
v
−1




By (3), and since zi is a continuous function, zi is strictly increasing if X−
P
zj(X)
is. Since this applies to all i,
P





zj(X) being weakly decreasing means that X −
P
zj(X) is strictly
increasing, it cannot be the case that
P
zj(X) is not strictly increasing. Thus P
zj(X) is strictly increasing and hence zi is strictly increasing.
By (6) and (7) there is a unique (z∗











i =1 . (14)
6Lemma 4 In equilibrium of the bidding mechanism Γ∗, p∗ is the winning bid and
z∗
¯ u is the u−group’s share of resources, for z∗ and p∗ as speciﬁed in (13) and (14).
Proof. Only if: F i r s tw ea r g u et h a tt h e r ea r ea tl e a s tt w oh i g h e s tb i d s .S u p po s e
that there is a single highest bid. Then buying the proposing right with price p










1+p − ε −
P
j6=i
zj(1 + p − ε)
#





[zj(1 + p) − zj(1 + p − ε)].
B u tb yL e m m a3t h i sc a n n o th o l d .
Thus at least two bidders bid the winning bid p. Then buying the proposing
right under p must be at least proﬁtable as the opportunity cost of letting the







− p ≥ zi(1 + p). (15)
Since increasing ones bid is not proﬁtable for the losing bargainer j that bids p,
"
1+p + ε −
P
k6=j
zk(1 + p + ε)
#
− (p + ε) ≤ zj(1 + p), for all ε>0. (16)







− p ≤ zk(1 + p). (17)






zi(1 + p)=¯ vi(zi(1 + p)+p), for all i =1 ,...,n.
By Lemma 5, this yields zi(1 + p)=z∗
i for all i, and p = p∗.
7If: Let all U bargainers bid p = p∗. By construction, zi(1 + p∗)=z∗
i for all















∗ = zi(1 + p
∗).
Thus decreasing o n e ’ sb i dd o e sn o th a v ep a y o ﬀ consequences. Increasing one’s bid
by ε>0 is strictly proﬁtable if
"
1+p







∗ + ε) >z i(1 + p
∗).










w h i c hi si nc o n ﬂict with Lemma 3. Thus all players bidding p∗ does constitute an
equilibrium.
We now argue that from the viewpoint of a single agent, the outcome of the auc-
tion among the representatives is the same as the limit outcome of the arbitration
process - the conﬂict-free allocation. Hence the auction mechanism implements
the desired arbitration scheme.
Proposition 4 The conﬂict-free allocation x∗ is the unique equilibrium allocation
of the bidding mechanism Γ∗.
Proof. Since ¯ u(¯ v(zu)) = ¯ u(zu)δ and (11) imply u(λ
−1
u ¯ v(zu)) = u(λ
−1
u zu)δ and
the deﬁnition of v implies u(λ
−1
u zu)δ = u(v(λ
−1
u zu)) we have ¯ v(zu)=λuv(λ
−1
u zu).
























u for all u, and
d∗ = λ












Constructing x∗ as in (10) now gives the result.
85C o n c l u d i n g r e m a r k s
An arbitration scheme should be such that the players cannot do better by rejecting
the scheme. We model the situation by assuming that the rejection triggers a
bargaining game in which the rejecting agent is the ﬁrst proposal. When the
population becomes large, only one allocation scheme remains feasible. We call
such scheme conﬂict-free. This outcome reﬂects fairness in a sense that it is an
outcome of an imaginary bargaining game in which no player beneﬁts unfairly
from the ﬁrst mover advantage.
With large population arbitration is hard as the optimal outcome is respon-
sive to the agents’ preferences. We construct a natural and simple mechanism
that implements the conﬂict-free allocation. Such mechanism has the following
interpretation: All agents with similar preferences group to form a "party". The
party, or its representative, acts on behalf of its members - gains and losses of
the party are divided evenly. The parties engage into bargaining over common
resources. However, before doing that they compete over the right to make the
ﬁrst proposal in the bargaining game. The winning bid is added to the pool of
common resources that is later shared via bargaining. The equilibrium outcome
of this process is precisely the conﬂict-free allocation. Thus the simple market
game (lobbying?) with small number of players can be used to induce a fair and
potentially complex allocation with many agents.
9A Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1. Recall that ci > 0 for all i and Y ≥ 0. By (3), v
−1
i (xi)−xi







− xi, for any xi ≥ 0, (19)
is continuous and monotonically increasing.




Since ei(·) is continuous and monotonically increasing, also its inverse
xi(e): =e
−1
i (e), for all e ∈ [0, ¯ ei],
is continuous and monotonically increasing in its domain [0, ¯ ei]. Condition (19)




, for all e ∈ [0, ¯ ei]. (20)
Moreover, since 0=xi(0) and ∞ = xi(¯ ei), there is, by the Intermediate Value




Proof of Proposition 2:. Only if: In a stationary SPE the game ends
in ﬁnite time. Assume that it never ends. Then each player receives zero. This
m e a n st h a ti na l ls u b g a m e se a c hp l a y e rm u s tg e tz e r o .O t h e r w i s et h e r ew o u l db ea
subgame where some oﬀer y =( y1,...,yn) is accepted. Because of stationarity this
oﬀer is accepted in every subgame. In particular, player 1 can deviate in the ﬁrst
period and oﬀer y =( y1,...,yn). T h i si sap r o ﬁtable deviation and constitutes a
contradiction with the assumption that there is a stationary SPE where the game
never ends.
Assume next that there is a stationary SPE where an oﬀer x(i) by some player
i ∈ {1,2,...,n}, is not accepted immediately. Denote by z(i) the equilibrium
o u t c o m ei nas u b g a m et h a ts t a r t sw i t ha no ﬀer x(i) of player i.B u tn o w p l a y e r
i could oﬀer z(i) instead of x(i); everyone else would accept the oﬀer as in the
stationary equilibrium acceptance depends only on the oﬀer.
10Thus, in any equilibrium, i(t)’s oﬀer x(i(t)) = (xj(i(t)))j∈N is accepted at
stage t ∈ {0,1,2,..}. In stationary equilibrium the time index t can be relaxed
from x(i(t)). An oﬀer x by i is accepted by all j 6= i if
xj(i) ≥ vj(xj(j)), for all j 6= i. (21)
Player i’s equilibrium oﬀer x(i) maximizes his payoﬀ with respect to constraint
(21) and the resource constraint. By A3, all constraints in (21) and the resource
constraint must bind. That is,




xi(j)=X, for all j. (23)
Since player i’s acceptance decision is not dependent on the name of the proposer,
there is xi > 0 such that xi(j)=xi for all j 6= i. By (22), xj(i) <x j(j) for all j.
Hence there is d>0 such that
n P
i=1
xi = X − d. (24)
By (22) and (24), x and d do meet (6) and (7). Since 1 is the ﬁrst proposer, the
resulting outcome is x(1) = (x1 + d,x2,...,xn).
If: Let x and d meet (6) and (7). Construct the following stationary strategy:
Player i always oﬀers x−i and does not accept less than xi. Player i’s oﬀer y is
accepted by all j 6= i only if
yj ≥ vj(X −
P
k6=j xk)=vj(xj + e1(x1)), for all j 6= i. (25)
Since vj is increasing, and since
xj = vj(xj + d), for all j 6= i,
i’s payoﬀ maximizing oﬀer to each j is xj.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n5 :
Lemma 5 For any n, there are unique y(n) ∈ Rn and d(n) > 0 such that
yi(n)=vi(yi(n)+d(n)), for all i =1 ,...,n, (26)
n P
u=1
yi(n)=n − d(n). (27)
11Proof. By Lemma 1.







xi ≤ 1, and xi ≥ yi(n), for all i =1 ,...,n
¾
.
Lemma 6 Let y(n) and d(n)be deﬁned as in Lemma 5. Then there is y∗ ∈ RU
and d∗ > 0 such that yi(n) →n y∗












u =1 . (29)
Proof. By Lemma 5, for any n =1 ,2,...,
yi(n)=vi(yi(n)+d(n)), for all i =1 ,...,n, (30)
n P
i=1
yi(n)=n − d(n). (31)









Deﬁne a function i : U → {1,2,...} such that ui(u) = u, for all u ∈ U. By station-





















1(ui=u) = λu. (33)
Take any subsequence {n0} under which limn0 yi(u)(n0) for all u and limn0 d(n0) exist










12By (30) limn0 d(n0)=∞ if and only if limn0 yi(u)(n0)=∞ for all u.T h u s ,
b y( 3 4 ) ,i tm u s tb et h ec a s et h a tlimn0 yi(u)(n0)=y∗
u and d(n)=d∗, for some
(y∗,d ∗) ∈ R
|U|











u =1 . (35)
By Lemma 1 and (30), y∗
i(u) is the limit of any converging subsequence {yi(u)(n00)},
and d∗ is the limit of any converging subsequence {d(n00)}.T h u s (y∗,d ∗) is the
unique limit and by (35), continuity, and (30) it meets the conditions imposed by
the lemma.
Proposition 5 As n →∞ , allocation x is implementable by the planner if and
only if x = x∗.
Proof. Again, deﬁne a function i : U → {1,2,...} such that ui(u) = u, for all
u ∈ U. By stationarity, yi(u)(n)=yj(n) if u = uj, for all j =1 ,...,n. The set of
















































xi(u)λu ≤ 1, and xj = xi(u) ≥ y
∗
i(u) if u = uj, for all u ∈ U
¾
.




+ : xj = y
∗
i(u) if u = uj, for all u ∈ U
ª
,
which is a singleton {x∗}, as required by the proposition.
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